Under
Section 61 of Karnataka Land Reforms act 1961. Occupancy granted to the
tenant by the final order of the tribunal cannot be transferred by the
occupant for 15 years from the date of final order. The land can be
partitioned among the family, can be bequeathed by will, but it cannot
be Sold, Gifted, Exchanged, Mortgaged, Leased or assigned.
A
CASE BEFORE FULL BENCH OF HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA WAS DECIDED BY HON’BLE
JUSTICES N.K. JAIN, H. RANGAVITTALACHAR AND V.G, SABHAHIT, HAS PASSED A
LAND MARK JUDGEMENT RELATED TO TENANTED LANDS AND PTCL ACT. In Mohammed
Jaffar and Another V State of Karnataka and Others, Reported in 2003(1)
Kar. L.J. 337 (FB).
1. Tenanted land that stood vested in State
Government as on 1-3-1974 under Land Reforms Act, does not become
"granted land" when occupancy in respect of such land is conferred on
tenant, merely because tenant happens to be person belonging to
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe — Vesting of tenanted land in State
Government is not absolute but is subject to vested right of tenant to
get occupancy conferred on him — Conferment of occupancy right on tenant
by Land Tribunal does not amount to making grant of land — Alienation
of land in respect of which occupancy was conferred on erstwhile tenant,
held, is not hit by prohibitions contained in Act of 1978.
2. A
bare reading of Section 3(l)(b) of the PTCL Act makes it clear that the
land should be granted by the Government and such land is to be granted
to a person belonging to Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes under
the relevant law including agrarian reforms. Once the land is held to be
a granted land, the restriction contained in Section 4 regarding the
apprehension of transfer of land would apply. . . . Section 44 of the
KLR Act deals with vesting of the land in the Government. Therefore, the
land which is not granted by the State Government cannot prima facie be
hit by the provisions of the PTCL Act.
3. All the lands held by
or in possession of the tenants vest with the State Government free from
all encumbrances and the State Government is entitled to take
possession of the said properties. However, as per Section 44(e) the
Government is not entitled to take possession of the tenanted land and
the permanent tenants, protected tenants and other tenants holding the
land are entitled to such right or privileges and subject to such
conditions provided under Act. In view of Section 44 of the KLR Act, it
is clear that conferment of occupancy right by the Land Tribunal, and
not by the Government, is only a declaration or pre-existing right which
has been conferred on the tenant under Section 45 and vesting of the
land is subject to right that is conferred on the tenant for conferment
of occupancy right- Section 45 of the KLR Act gives a right to a person
who is a tenant on the land to get the occupancy right conferred in his
favour and Sections 48 and 48-A deals with the constitution of the
Tribunals and enquiry by the Tribunal. The occupancy right will be
conferred by the Land Tribunal and not by the Government under Section
48-A of the KLR Act on a tenant who was cultivating the land personally
on 1-3-1974. Therefore, what is conferred on the tenant who was
personally cultivating the land on 1-3-1974 is the declaration of his
occupancy right of land on 1-3-1974, by the Tribunal. The preamble to
the KLR Act clearly shows that the Act is enacted to confer ownership on
the tenants and wherefore, it is clear that the conferment of occupancy
right on the tenant who was personally cultivating the land on 1-3-1974
is conferment of ownership on the tenant as per the preamble to the Act
and the same is subject to certain restrictions which are imposed in
the certificate of registration issued under Section 55 of the Act in
Form 10.
4. Conferment of occupancy right is only declaration of
the fact that the tenant who was personally cultivating the land on
1-3-1974 and the land which has vested with the Government, the tenant
js declared as the occupant of the said land subject to the restrictions
contained in the certificate of registration and if the tenant proves
that he has been personally cultivating the land on 1-3-1974 he cannot
be denied conferment of occupancy right. .... Under the circumstances,
it is clear that occupancy right cannot at all fall within the ambit of
'granted land' as defined under the PTCL Act. The vesting of land in the
Government is subject to vested right of a tenant to get occupancy
right and for determination of right and conferment of occupancy by Land
Tribunal, a Statutory Authority established under the Land Reforms Act,
is the Competent Authority to determine the same on a tenant who was
personally cultivating the land on 1-3-1974.
5. In view of this,
the occupancy right, which has been granted by the Land Tribunal, cannot
be construed as "granted land" as defined under the PTCL Act. The land
in respect of which the occupancy right has conferred under Section 48-A
of the KLR Act would not fall within the ambit of 'granted land' as
defined under Section 3(1 }(b) of the PTCL Act.
AGRICULTURAL LAND
It
includes garden land and land capable of being used for agricultural
purposes or purposes subservient thereto — Whether land in question is
agricultural land or not is question of fact, and where that question
has been decided by Tribunal on basis of evidence on record and spot
inspection, its decision cannot be interfered with in writ petition.
Section 2-A(18) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act defines "land" to mean
the land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural
purposes or purposes subservient thereto and includes garden land. The
Tribunal is a fact finding authority. Since it has recorded the findings
on appreciation of the evidence available on record, this Court in
exercise of the power under accuseds 226 and 227 of the Constitution
cannot re-appreciate the evidence and arrive at different findings. —
Alban D'Souza v The Land Tribunal, Udupi and Others, ILR 1999 Kar. 243.
AGRICULTURAL LABOURER WITH OTHER AVOCATION TO AUGMENT HIS INCOME
Merely
because an agricultural labourer, to augment his income for the
maintenance of himself and his family, for some time runs a tea shop in a
portion of the dwelling-house, cannot be a ground to deprive him of the
right given to an agricultural labourer to register him as an owner of a
dwelling-house located in a village, as provided under Section 38 of
the Act. — Dhananjaya Viswesvaraya Hegde v fatti Kuppa Naika (Deceased)
by L.Rs and Others, 2002(3) Kar. L.J. 233A.
PUNJA LANDS
Punja
lands in Dakshina Kannada District are not agricultural lands as only
thatched grass are grown in those lands naturally and such lands are not
brought under cultivation. . . . Where punja land is brought under
cultivation, it is not a bar on the parties to adduce evidence that such
land is brought under cultivation for agricultural purpose. No such
evidence is there in this case. — Subhakar and Others v The Land
Tribunal, Karkala Taluk, Karkala and Others, 1999(4) Kar. LJ. 524 (DB).
Tenancy
for non-agricultural purpose — Claim to occupancy — Where lease is for
non-agricultural purpose, merely because portion of land leased is used
by tenant for running poultry farm and for horticulture, such land
cannot be held to be agricultural land — Claim for occupancy, held, is
not sustainable. In the instant case, the land in dispute is described
as "punja land" in the earliest lease deed of 1935. Now the said land is
situated within the City Corporation limits of Mangalore Town. The
dominant purpose for which the land was leased is clearly indicated in
the said lease deed that it was for the purpose of construction of a
house and for possession and enjoyment of the same. Even the subsequent
rental agreement dated 28-12-1945 taken by the petitioner as a mortgagee
of the mulageni rights from the mulagenidars also indicates that the
purpose of the said lease is for residential use of the house
constructed thereon on a monthly rent fixed for a period of 11 months.
The petitioner described himself as a 'Salesman' in Form No. VII filed
by him and even in the evidence given by him before the Land Tribunal,
he has given the same occupation of him. The land in dispute is
described as hillock area in the Commissioner's report. Mere existence
of trees in the compound of house constructed on punja land does not
convert the land into an agricultural land when the dominant purpose of
the lease is found to be for non- agricultural use and when the
petitioner was not found to be an agriculturist by the notified date.
The subsequent use of some portion of the land as a poultry farm, for
growing vegetables and for raising some fruit bearing trees after the
notified date cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the lease of the said land was for agricultural
purposes by the notified date. Since it is found that the dominant
purpose of the lease was only for non-agricultural purposes, the
Appellate Authority was justified in holding that the land in dispute
was not an agricultural land by the notified date and that the
petitioner was not the tenant of the land in dispute for agricultural
use of land by the notified date. — Narayana Devadiga (Deceased) by
L.Rs. v Smt. Sharada and Others, 2002(1) Kar. L.J. 581A.
REMAND TO TRIBUNAL FOR FRESH DECISION ON LAPSES
The
Judge in a writ petition quashing the order must remit the case to the
Tribunal for a fresh disposal after affording opportunity to the
petitioner. The case should not be decided by the Judge on
re-appreciation of the evidence. The definition of agricultural land
includes land which is capable of being used for agricultural purposes
and also a forest land. Hence land on which casurina is raised is
capable of being used for agricultural purposes and even as forest land
it is agricultural land within the definition, Raising of casurina trees
which are not of spontaneous growth is cultivation within Section 2(10)
of the Act. Byalappa v State of Karnataka and Others, AIR 1982 Kant. 79
ACTS SUB-SERVIENT TO CULTIVATION OF LAND
Petitioner
made an application for grant of occupancy in land measuring 8 guntas
in a Survey No. Chilly plants were raised in two guntas and the
remaining extent of land was used as thrashing floor and for stacking
hay. Land as defined in Section 2(18) means not only land which is used
for raising crops, but also land which is used for purposes sub-servient
to raising crops. Thrashing of crops can reasonably be regarded as
being sub-servient to growing of crops. Likewise, stocking fodder for
feeding bullocks maintained by an agriculturist for ploughing the land
can also be regarded as sub-servient to cultivation of land. Thrashing
of crops can also reasonably be regarded as improving agricultural
produce. Hence, the land can be regarded as land cultivated for the
purpose of Section 45. It is only if the applicant was cultivating the
land as tenant, he would be entitled to be registered as occupant; if he
was cultivating the land as mortgagee in possession, he would not be
entitled to be registered. Gurubasappa v Land Tribunal, Hirekerur,
1980(1) Kar. LJ. Sh. N. 132.
TENANCY FOR NONAGRICULTURAL PURPOSE — CLAIM TO OCCUPANCY.
The
Act does not apply to all kinds of lands- in the State and to all
categories of tenants. If the relationship of landlord and tenant does
not rest on agrarian relations, the tenant who is in possession of the
land, even if the land is an agricultural land not avail himself of any
benefit under the Act. The governing factor to bring the case within the
fold of the Act will be the relationship of landlord and tenant based
on agrarian relations. The tenancy must relate to agriculture in order
to bring the relationship of landlord and tenant within the ambit of
agrarian relations. In the district of Dakshina Kannada there was no
classification of lands as agricultural and non-agricultural. When a
lease is evidenced by a written document in which the object or purpose
of the lease is stated, then the purpose of the lease as stated in the
lease deed concludes the question whether the land demised is
agricultural land and the lessee a tenant within the meaning of the Act,
notwithstanding the fact the land demised is a nanja or bagayat land.
Tenancies and leases of land to which the Land Reforms Act applies are
also subject to the prohibitions and limitations prescribed under
Section 108(O) of the T.P. Act. Hence, a lessee cannot take advantage of
a wrong committed by him by using the land leased for a different
purpose than for which it was leased out to claim the benefit under the
Act. The lands were demised for specific non-agricultural purposes, the
purposes being industries, business, trade, manufacturing, residential,
cinema theatres and any other purposes. The, tenancy was by the English
calender month, rent being payable on the 5th of the succeeding month.
In case of default interest was payable on the arrears. The lessee was
directed to pay all taxes relating to the lands and to deduct the same
from the rent. The lessee could erect such machinery, effect
improvements, Repairs and do new construction or re-construction of
buildings etc. The lands were situated within the Mangalore Municipal
Limits. The properties demised were four items of land measuring 3 acres
69 cents classified as bagayat consisting of one tiled old main house,
one small tiled old out house, thatched cow shed and bath shed, two
wells, 40 mango trees, 6 jack trees, 75 coconut trees and 50 cashew
trees. The lessee ran a cashew factory therein. The holding was not an
agricultural holding and the lessee was not entitled to conferment of
occupancy rights under the Act. The lessee could not also be held to be a
deemed tenant within Section 4 of the Act. The emphasis in Section 4 is
on 'lawful cultivation' and not 'lawful possession'. If a person taking
agricultural lands for purpose of industries, commerce etc., uses it
for agricultural purposes, his possession of the land will be lawful,
but cultivation would not be lawful, as it would offend Section 108(O)
of T.P.Act. — Bhamy Panduranga Shenoy v B.H. Ravindra and Others, AIR
1980 NOC 115.
ENTRIES IN RTC AND AVERMENTS IN SALE DEED
Entries
in record of rights raise presumption that what is stated therein is
correct, but averments in sale deed have no such presumptive value and
facts stated therein have to be proved to be believed — Court cannot
disbelieve entries in record of rights in absence of evidence to rebut
presumption arising there from and merely on basis of unproved averment
in sale deed. Muniyappa v G. Hanumanihappa (Deceased) By L.R. and
Others, 2003(2) Kar. LJ. 294.
PERSONAL CULTIVATION OF LAND OF WIFE BY HUSBAND
A
husband cultivating personally land belonging to his wife would be an
agriculturist within Section 2-A(3) of the Act. Such cultivation would
amount to cultivation on his own account within Section 2-A(11). Where
one member of the family gets cultivated land of the owner member of the
family through hired labour under his own supervision, the said
cultivation by such supervising member would fall within the definition
of personal cultivation in Section 2-A(11). Such construction of Clause
(11) of Section 2-A does not militate against the explanations to the
clause. The three explanations had been added to mitigate hardship which
would have otherwise resulted to certain persons if the explanations
had not been added. In all the three cases, i.e.. cultivation of the
land held by persons covered by Explanation I or by a joint family
covered by Explanation II or by a company or association etc., covered
by Explanation III, through hired labour under the supervision of an
employee, would be considered on account of such persons, although if
these explanations had not been added, such would not be the case. This
however would not prove the converse, that is, if a member of the family
as defined by clause (12) gets cultivated land belonging to his family
member through hired labour under his supervision, such cultivation of
the land would not be treated as cultivation by such supervising member
on his own account. The above construction of clause (11) would not
defeat the objects of Section 80. — State of Karnataka and Another v
Vasudem R.P., 1976(2) Kar. L.J. 382.
CULTIVATE PERSONALLY
Petitioner
was member of a joint family consisting of himself and four brothers
and the pahani extracts showed that petitioner was cultivating the land
as a tenant from 1964 upto date. Petitioner's application for grant of
occupancy was rejected solely on the ground that he was employed as
Secretary in a land mortgage Bank. Held: It was the duty of the Tribunal
to examine whether petitioner answered the definition of
'agriculturist' who cultivated lands personally. Under Section 2(11) to
'cultivate personally' includes cultivation of the land by the labour of
any member of one's family or even hired labour. Further the pahani
entries are presumed to be true until they are replaced by some other
entries. The order of rejection cannot hence be sustained. — Raniasingh
H.R. v Nagesh Rao D, ILR 1977 Kar. 1350
WIFE CANNOT CLAIM TENANCY UNDER HUSBAND
A
member of the family as defined in the Act cannot claim tenancy under
another member of the same family and seek registration of occupancy.
Thus, a husband or the wife, as the case may be, cannot claim tenancy
right as against the other in respect of his or her land. — A.
Jalajakshi D. Aiwa v Meenaxi Naik and Another, 1980(2) Kar. LJ. 60.
"HADI" LAND
Land
used for collecting leaves from shrubs and plants grown thereon for
manuring adjacent land used for agricultural purpose — Such land, in
District of Dakshina Kannada, comes within definition of "land", as such
land cannot be considered as land used for non-agricultural purposes —
Grant of occupancy in respect of such "hadi" land along with occupancy
in respect of adjacent agricultural land is to be held in order.
Ramachandra Devastanam, Sawada v Subbanna Shetty and Others, ILR 1998
Kar. 1588.
LAND WITH BUILDING — IF AGRICULTURAL LAND.
While
determining whether the premises should be regarded as agricultural or
non-agricultural, one must look to the dominant characteristics of such
premises. The mere fact that there are some plants and trees in the
compound of a house will not render the premises an agricultural one.
Like-wise the mere fact that in an agricultural land there is a house
used as a farm house will not render such premises non-agricultural. Not
one factor is decisive and the cumulative effect of all factors should
be considered. Where the premises were situated within municipal limits,
were assessed to municipal tax, the tenancy was monthly and not annual,
that the rent was monthly and not annual and the tenant was not an
agriculturist by profession, held, the conclusion that premises are
non-agricultural cannot be said to be erroneous. — Vanajakshi v land
Tribunal, Udupi and Another, 1979(1) Kar. LJ. 412 (DB).
HOUSE WITH LAND FARM HOUSE
Defendant
took the house and land appurtenant on lease for 11 months for a
consolidated rent. After the expiry of the lease, the plaintiff sued for
eviction. The land measured more than four acres and there were some
coconut plants on the land. The lessee was a student and not a farmer.
There was nothing to show that the lessee was cultivating in the land
appurtenant. On a reading of the lease deed, it was manifest that what
was let out was the house along with the land appurtenant and it was a
lease of a dwelling house. A farm house is a house constructed in the
farm which is cultivated by the farmer to facilitate him in the better
cultivation of the farm. Even if a few coconut trees or other trees are
found around the house, that would not convert the residential house
into a farm house nor the tenant into an agriculturist. Lakshmana Gowda v
Dorris, J. Coates, 1983(1) Kar. LJ. Sh. N. 85.
DWELLING HOUSE OF AGRICULTUAL LABOURERS
Even
if the land was converted for non-agricultural purposes, an
agricultural labourer, who is residing in a dwelling-house located in a
village, will not lose his right to be registered as an owner in respect
of the said land. Section 38 of the Act confers power on the Tribunal
to register an agricultural labourer, who ordinarily resides in a
dwelling-house on a land not belonging to him situated in any village.
The word 'land' referred to in Section 38 of the Act in the context and
in the background of the purpose of Section 38 of the Act, should not be
given a restricted meaning as an agricultural land as defined under
Section 2(18) of the Act. Section 2(18) of the Act must be understood
for the purpose of conferment of occupancy right. The object of Section
38 of the Act is to register an agricultural labourer as an owner
thereof in respect of the house and the land appurtenant thereto. While
the object of conferment of occupancy right on an agricultural tenant is
to give occupancy right to a tiller of the land, the object of Section
38 of the Act is to register an agricultural labourer who is residing in
a dwelling-house not belonging to him located in a village, as owner
thereof. In that background, if Section 38 of the Act is understood the
nature of the land as to whether it is an agricultural land or a
non-agricultural land, will not make any difference. The only
requirement to register a person as an owner of a dwelling-house located
in a village, is that he should be an agricultural labourer. Dhananjaya
Visweswara Hegde v Jatti Kuppa Naika (Deceased) by L.Rs and Others,
2002(3) Kar. LJ. 233.
CONVERTED LAND
Agricultural land
— Converted to non-agricultural use — Lease of building constructed on
such land — Whether agricultural lease or building lease — Claim for
occupancy — Where land was converted as non-agricultural land prior to
1-3-1974, and building constructed thereon was leased on monthly rental
basis, such land cannot be considered as agricultural land and Tribunal
has no jurisdiction to grant occupancy right to tenant claiming same. In
this case, the HRC Court has come to the conclusion that the dominant
purpose of taking the property on lease was for residential purpose and
not for agricultural purpose. The property also was converted to
non-agricultural purpose. The rent also was fixed on monthly basis and
it was taken only for two months. The crop grown in the remaining area
is only a few fruit bearing trees in the compound. For the foregoing
reasons, the argument that still it is an agricultural land and not a
non-agricultural land, is liable to be rejected. K. Jathappa Rai v State
of Karnataka and Others, 2000(4) Kar. LJ. 503.
Non-agricultural
land does not come within purview of Act — Such land does not vest with
State Government under Section 44 of Act — Land Tribunal has no
jurisdiction to enquiry into claims for occupancy in respect of such
land. If the land is not a land which is used or capable of being used
for agricultural purpose or purposes subservient thereto, having been
alienated for non-agricultural purpose, in accordance with the
provisions of the relevant Land Revenue Act, it cannot be a
subject-matter of enquiry before the Land Tribunal as the Land Tribunal
gets no jurisdiction to enquire into the claim for occupancy in respect
of such lands. The land in question being a non-agricultural land as on
1-3-1974, is not a "land" as defined by Section 2-A(18) of the Act and
therefore, it did not fall within the purview of the Act. It also did
not vest in the State Government under Section 44 of the Act. Therefore
the Land Tribunal did not get jurisdiction to enquire into the claim for
occupancy. — Mallikarjun Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Hubli v
State of Kamataka and Others, 1995(6) Kar. L.J. 46A.
LAND DOES NOT INCLUDE HOUSE-SITE
Land
does not include house-site or land used exclusively for
non-agricultural purposes and no occupancy right in respect of such land
can be conferred on occupant thereof. Tenant has put forth his claim to
tenancy with respect to the particular area of 24 cents as an
independent land under his cultivation. But on his own showing this plot
of 24 cents was not at all a cultivable land in that it was his
dwelling premises exclusively in his possession and enjoyment as on the
material date 1-3-1974. It is not his further case that this 24 cents of
land was part and parcel of a single land under his cultivation as a
tenant so as to characterize his said house as a farm house. The land in
respect of which the person in occupation thereof is entitled to claim
tenancy under the Act must be the "Land" within the meaning of the
definition contained in sub-section (18) of Section 2-A of the Act A
plain reading of the definition of the land contained in Section 2(18)
of the Act makes it clear that "the land used exclusively for
non-agricultural purpose" does not fall within the purview of the Act
and therefore the respondents' claim of tenancy with respect to the said
24 cents of the land is legally untenable. Both the authorities below
have erred in law'in considering his claim of tenancy with respect to
the said 24 cents of the land whole of which is used by him as a
dwelling house. — Kittanna Rai (deceased) by L.Rs v Sheena Poojary and
Others, 2000(1) Kar. L.J. 341.
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY
Section
44(2) of the Amendment Act which gives retrospective effect to the
decision of Section 14 and also nullifies judgments, decrees or orders,
by removing the basis on which such judgments, decrees or orders was
founded, is not unconstitutional. The Amended Act in so far as it
provides for vesting in the State of tenanted lands and surplus lands in
excess of the ceiling limit owned by religious institutions is not
violative of Article 26 of the Constitution. Article 26 does not affect
the power of the State to acquire any property belonging to a religious
denomination. The Amendment of Section 63 further reducing the ceiling
limit cannot be said to be unreasonable. The reduction in the ceiling
limit resulting in acquisition of some lands under personal cultivation
does not offend the second proviso to Article 31-A. The Amendment of the
definition of 'family' in Section 2(12) by including unmarried
daughters is not liable to attack as violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Amendment of Section 15 by which right to resume by
widows, unmarried daughters, minors and physically handicapped has been
taken away is protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution. The
protective cloak of Article 31-A of the Constitution is available to the
machinery provisions of the law relating to agrarian reforms. Thus the
protection is available to the provisions which relate to Constitution
of Special Tribunals and conferring upon them adjudicatory jurisdiction.
In spite of the infirmity in not providing for security of tenure of
the Tribunal, and the absence of a provision for appeal, revision or
reference from orders of Tribunals and for transfer of cases from one
Tribunal to another, the constitutionality of Section 48 is not open to
challenge, as it enjoys the protection under Article 31-A. Having
excluded the jurisdiction of Civil and Criminal Courts under Sections
132 and 133, it was competent to the legislature to take away such
jurisdiction retrospectively also and to render ineffective orders
already made by such Courts. Hence Section 133(l)(iii) providing that
all interim orders by Courts shall stand dissolved or vacated, is valid.
— Sri Jagadguru Durundundeswara Sidha Sansthan Math at Nidasosi,
Belgaum District v State of Karnataka and Another, 1983(1) Kar. L.J.
489.
What the 2nd proviso to Article 31-A(1), Constitution states is
that whenever any land under personal cultivation which is within the
ceiling limit applicable to a person as in force on the date of such
acquisition is acquired by the State Government, compensation will have
to be paid at a rate not less than the market value thereof. The said
proviso does not impose any fetter on the legislature to reduce the
ceiling limit from time to time if it wishes to do so. Bhaskar v State
of Karnataka, AIR 1975 Kar. 55
ASSIGNEE FROM PERMANENT TENANT AFTER 1-3-1974 — RIGHTS
Where
a mulgeni (permanent) tenant was in possession and personally
cultivated the lands, on 1-3-1974 transferred his mulgeni right by
registered gift deed on 15-4-1974. Under Section 44(1) of the Act, the
lands held by the permanent tenant stood transferred and vested in the
State Government and under Section 45(1) the only right, given to the
tenant was to be registered as an occupant; and the right possessed by
the tenant after the date of vesting (after 1-3-1974) was not
transferable and as such the donee did not acquire the right to get
himself registered as an occupant. Even assuming that the gift was a
valid transfer, he could not be registered as an occupant as he was not a
tenant of the land or personally cultivating the same on the date of
vesting. Shambhu Eshwar Hegde v Land Tribunal, Kumta and Another,
1979(2) Kar. L.J. 194.
APPLICABILITY OF THE DEFINITION OF 'PERSON' IN THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT.
The
word 'person' is not denned in the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.
Therefore, the definition given in the General Clauses Act will apply.
The word 'person' includes a 'joint family' and in view of Explanation
II to Section 2, it is clear that the Tribunal has the power to decide
whether a joint family is or is not a tenant under Section 112(b) of the
Act. Explanation II to Section 2 provides that in the case of a joint
family, the land shall be deemed to be cultivated personally, if it is
cultivated by any member of such family. Hence, the claim of the
appellants that they have been personally cultivating the lands,
assuming to be correct, Explanation II to Section 2 would be attracted. —
Guruvappa, K. and Another v Smt. Manjappa Hengsu and Others, ILR 1985
Kar. 386 (DB). Parwetewwa v State of Karnataka, ILR 1985 Kar. 1257.
PERSON CLAIMING TITLE — LAWFULLY CULTIVATE THE LAND.
To
be a deemed tenant, one must lawfully cultivate the land belonging to
another person. The word 'lawful' requires that the possession must be
capable of being defended successfully, if action is taken. A deemed
tenant also should pay rent. A person lawfully cultivating the land of
another must necessarily pay rent for use and occupation. A person
cultivating land claiming it as his own is not lawfully cultivating the
land belonging to another. It is a case of dispute relating to title. A
person claiming to remain in possession as owner cannot be deemed
tenant. — Chokkannagari Namyanappa v Land Tribunal, Qiintamani and
Another, 1982(2) Kar. L.J. 21.
Tenant' definition does not
include persons who were tenants sometimes before 1-3-1974 or sometime
before coming into operation of Land Reforms Act — Person claiming to be
a tenant must show that he has been and he is in cultivation of land
even on 1-3-1974. — Vilas Alias Gundu Ananthacharya v State of
Karnataka, ILR 1987 Kar. 1428.
If a person in possession of land
under such an agreement continues in possession of the property after
the expiry of the period of the agreement his possession will not be
that of a tenant in the absence of proof that an agreement of tenancy
was entered into after the expiry of the period. Hence the question of
applying the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and declaring
him as a tenant would not arise. — Veerappa Rudrappa v Land Tribunal
ILR1976 Kar. 116.
BEQUEATHING TENANT'S INTEREST BY WILL
Statute
has premptorily provided succession which cannot be defeated by tenant
by bequeathing his interest — No person can be called a tenant unless he
cultivates land lawfully — When a tenant cannot bequeath right of
tenancy, person claiming benefit under such a Will cannot be termed as a
tenant — Such person not entitled to grant of occupancy right. —
Thimmakka Kom Venkanna Naik v Land Tribunal and Others, ILR 1987 Kar.
3336 (DB).
TRUST PROPERTY AND TENANT
Agriculturist who
cultivates personally land he holds on lease from landlord — Person
coming within definition of tenant as on 1-3-1974 is entitled to grant
of occupancy right in respect of land held by him on lease. The
petitioner's father was inducted as a lawful tenant with effect from
19-6-1951 and the said lease was also approved earlier by the District
Judge on 27-5-1951 as provided for in the scheme of the Management of
the Trust, for the said scheme provided therein that all the leases of
the agricultural land for more than three years of the respondent
1-Trust could be made only with the previous sanction of the District
Judge. Therefore, the petitioner was lawful tenant as on 1-3-1974 within
the meaning of Section 2(34) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. . . .
The petitioner is entitled to for grant of occupancy right by the Land
Tribunal and therefore the rejection of the claim by the Land Tribunal
is not justified. — Satyamurthy v Siddaroodmath Punch Committee, Hubli
and Others, 1997(2) Kar. L.J. 631.
TENANT IN POSSESSION AFTER DETERMINATION OF TENANCY — RIGHT TO OCCUPANCY.
Respondent
2 had cultivated the lands as tenant even prior to 1956. Petitioner —
Landlord sent a registered notice under Section 31(i)(a) BTAL Act
terminating respondent 2's tenancy on 28-3-1955 and on the expiry of the
period of one year, filed an application for possession. The matter
went up to the High Court which upheld the claim of the landlord and
granted 3 months time to respondent 2 to harvest the standing crop,
which time expired on 8-12-1961. respondent 2 filed application claiming
occupancy rights and the same was granted by the Land Tribunal. On the
writ by landlord. After the tenancy of respondent 2 came to be validly
determined by the notice issued by the petitioner, he (R-2) continued to
be in possession not as a tenant but as a tresspasser. Respondent-2 was
not a tenant within and protected by Section 2(e) Tenants Temporary
Protection from Eviction Act, 1961. Respondent 2 was not a tenant on the
lands in question as on 1-3-1974 though he was cultivating these lands.
When that is so, the lands could not, in law, vest in the Government.
Hence, no question of conferring occupancy right on respondent 2 arises.
Basayya v Land Tribunal, Hungund and Another, 1978(2) Kar. L.J. 131.
DISPUTES CONNECTED WITH AGRARIAN RELATIONS
Section
4 of Act 31 of 1974, is applicable to cases where relief of injunction
is claimed in disputes connected with agrarian relations; and has no
application to suits for enforcement of easementary right or rights of
that nature. Where the plaintiff claimed that by virtue of an agreement
entered into between the parties, plaintiff had acquired the right to
convey water for irrigating his land through the lands of the
defendants, a suit to prevent infringement of a right of this nature is
not one to which Act 31 of 1974 has any application. The power of
granting interim injunction ex parte has to be exercised with great
caution by Civil Courts. The Trial Court was justified in making the
order of temporary injunction ex parte. — Gurupadayya Nagayya v Mahadu
Arjun, AIR 1976 Kant. 66 : ILR 1976 Kar. 151.
DEEMED TENANCY — CLAIM BY PERSON CULTIVATING LAND
Claim
is sustainable only if possession and cultivation is lawful — Where
cultivation of land by person is without authority of real owner of
land, claim for deemed tenancy on basis of such cultivation being
carried on is not sustainable. Deemed tenancy is available only in the
case of tenant who is lawfully cultivating the lands. Admittedly in the
case on hand the real owner, the Mutt has not permitted or granted the
respondent to cultivate the land belonging to Mutt. Therefore Section 4
is not available to the petitioner. — Kanthu v The Land Tribunal,
Siddapur, Uttara Kannada District and Others, 2001(2) Kar. LJ. 477B.
